Journal of Financial Crises
Volume 4

Issue 2

2022

European Central Bank: Fine-Tuning Operations
Corey N. Runkel
Yale School of Management

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises
Part of the Economic Policy Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons,
Macroeconomics Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, Policy History, Theory,
and Methods Commons, and the Public Administration Commons

Recommended Citation
Runkel, Corey N. (2022) "European Central Bank: Fine-Tuning Operations," Journal of Financial Crises: Vol.
4 : Iss. 2, 787-816.
Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol4/iss2/37

This Case Study is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Financial Crises and
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact
journalfinancialcrises@yale.edu.

European Central Bank: Fine-Tuning Operations1
Corey N. Runkel2
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study
July 15, 2022
Abstract
Credit in the European interbank market tightened in August 2007 as banks sustained losses
in mortgage-backed securities markets. On August 9, the European Central Bank (ECB)
announced a EUR 95 billion fine-tuning operation (FTO). The Eurosystem continued
providing FTOs carrying overnight maturities through the next three business days. Two
more bouts of interbank funding stress—in March and September 2008—caused the ECB to
deploy more FTOs. The ECB provided liquidity through 12 emergency, overnight FTOs, all
but one at least EUR 25 billion in size. All operations, except the first and last, used variablerate, fixed-allotment auctions. The first and last operations used a procedure known as fixedrate, full-allotment, which saw the ECB provide as much liquidity as banks requested at the
central bank’s policy rate. In October 2008, the ECB tendered its last emergency FTO in favor
of its longer-term refinancing operations, which would comprise most of its broad-based
liquidity support for the duration of the crisis. However, FTOs were not a tool designed to
fight financial crises. They were a technical measure—in other words, the ECB typically used
them to tweak reserves to keep interest rates within its monetary policy target range. Crisis
usage of FTOs often preceded introductions and expansions of crisis-fighting tools. This
sequencing led some scholars to characterize the FTOs as the central bank’s first line of
defense during the Global Financial Crisis. Though FTOs seemed to halt the spikes in
interbank funding spreads, they were ineffective at relieving stress in those markets, a task
they were not designed to address.
Keywords: emergency liquidity, European Central Bank, European Union, fixed-rate, full
allotment, Global Financial Crisis, LTROs, SLTROs, TROs
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Overview
On August 9, 2007, spreads between secured
and unsecured overnight funding spiked,
stressing Europe’s interbank funding market.
Underregulated and opaque financial
relationships obscured the immediate cause
for this spike, and the European Central Bank
(ECB) used a EUR 95 billion fine-tuning
operation (FTO) to provide euro area banks
with quick liquidity (Trichet 2010). FTOs
generally carried overnight maturities and
could be deployed the same day they were
announced. They were usually technical
operations, that is, the ECB used them to keep
interest rates within its target range. Their
size was dictated by the reserve position of
banks with respect to the ECB and other
national central banks in the eurozone.
However, this jolt of financial distress proved
to be only the first of many during the Global
Financial Crisis (GFC). The ECB then provided
EUR 61 billion in an FTO on August 10, EUR
48 billion on August 13, and EUR 8 billion on
August 14 (ECB 2021). Throughout the crisis,
FTOs were used as a crisis-fighting tool
despite their original design.
Eligible participants were selected by their
national central banks from the set of
institutions eligible for other monetary policy
operations. Successful participants secured
funding within a day’s notice (ECB 2006b).
Accepted collateral was initially limited to
euro-denominated marketable securities
rated at least A- and nonmarketable debt
from highly rated issuers. Haircuts were
adjusted according to several factors (see
Figures 8 and 9 in the Appendix). Successful
banks paid the interest rates they bid. The
ECB used this variable-rate, fixed-allotment
regime for almost all FTOs after the August 9
operation.
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Key Terms
Purpose: “To assure orderly functioning of the euro
money market” (ECB 2020)
Launch Dates

Announcement: August
9, 2007
First settlement: August
9, 2007

Expiration Dates

Last announcement:
October 9, 2010
Last maturity: October
15, 2010

Legal Authority

ESCB Treaty, article
18.1

Peak Outstanding

EUR 95 billion on
August 9, 2007

Participants

Eurozone banks chosen
by national central
banks from financially
sound counterparties

Rate

Auction between August
10, 2007, and October 8,
2008. Fixed-rate, fullallotment for first and
last operations

Collateral

Schedule of marketable
and nonmarketable
debt (see Figures 8 and
9)

Loan Duration

Overnight (though
actual terms lasted up
to six days)

Notable Features

Announced, allotted,
and settled within four
hours

Outcomes

Support repaid 100%,
no fiscal costs
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Later that month, the ECB announced it would supplement its monthly longer-term
refinancing operations (LTROs) with another three-month-maturity tender each month. It
would later expand these TROs to include monthly tenders of one-, six-, 12-, and 36-month
funding (ECB 2020). The use of FTOs to quickly soothe markets before the ECB expanded
LTROs became a recurring feature of its crisis response.
Late March 2008 saw the interbank funding market flare up again following the bankruptcy
and sale of Bear Stearns, a large American investment bank. The ECB injected EUR 30 billion
in two FTOs on March 20 and 31 before introducing six-month LTROs (ECB 2021; ECB 2020).
The ECB engaged in its final burst of FTO activity in September 2008, after the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers, another large American investment bank, triggered the highest spreads
between the three-month Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) and the Euro Overnight
Index Average (EONIA). The ECB pumped in liquidity with five EUR 20 billion–EUR 70 billion
FTOs between September 15 and 24. These, like all prior FTO operations, were conducted
using the variable-rate allotment process. However, the ECB then shifted from FTOs to openmarket operations conducted at a fixed rate with full allotment, meaning that banks received
as much funding as they requested at a rate set by the ECB. The rate used was the Main
Refinancing Rate, which the ECB had long set for its weekly Main Refinancing Operations
(ECB 2008a). The last FTO, on October 9, used this allotment procedure and an expanded set
of eligible collateral. See Figure 1 for a depiction of liquidity-providing FTOs during the GFC.
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Figure 1: Liquidity-Providing Fine-Tuning Operations during the GFC

Note: The gray line indicates a 14-day moving average of the EONIA, and the bars above and below operations
show banks’ minimum and maximum bids, an indicator of bank stress levels.
Source: Bank of France 2021; ECB 2021.

Summary Evaluation
“Increasing the frequency and gross size of discretionary operations was the first, common
line of defence” for large central banks responding to the GFC (Borio and Nelson 2008).
However, the FTOs were not designed to fight crises, and little has been written on the
impact of liquidity-providing FTOs; scholars have focused more on their technical function,
the frontloading policy of liquidity-absorbing FTOs (see, for instance, Cassola and Huetl
2010). After FTOs were conducted, interbank funding spreads neither climbed nor fell
significantly. Additionally, each FTO was oversubscribed, and seven FTOs received more
than twice the amount bid than was available. That the ECB also paired them during the GFC
with LTROs suggests that FTOs had limited efficacy, though Trichet (2010) and Aucremanne
et al. (2007) suggest that they were effective stopgaps.
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Context: Eurozone 2008–2009

GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)

$14,099.1 billion in 2008
$12,885.8 billion in 2009
$42,178 in 2008
$38,424 in 2009

Not applicable; ratings applied to
each country’s debt
$19,181.7 billion in 2008
Size of banking system
$18,225.6 billion in 2009
Size of banking system
129% of 2008 GDP
149% of 2009 GDP
as a percentage of GDP
71% of financial system assets in
Size of banking system
2008
68%
of
financial
system assets in
as a percentage of financial system
2009
88.2% of assets in 2008
Five-bank concentration of banking system
84.3% of assets in 2009
18.0% of assets in 2008
Foreign involvement in banking system
19.1% of assets in 2009
Data not available in 2008
Government ownership of banking system
Data not available in 2009
Country-level insurance, but none
EU-wide in 2008
Existence of deposit insurance
Country-level insurance, but none
EU-wide in 2009
Sources: Federal Reserve Economic Data; World Bank Global Financial Development
Database.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: FTOs, which had long been used to respond to unexpected liquidity
fluctuations, took on a new scale during the GFC so that they could “assure the
orderly functioning of the euro money market.”
During the GFC, the ECB used liquidity-providing FTOs as a crisis-fighting measure to relieve
cash-strapped banks (Trichet 2009). FTOs could be announced, allotted, and settled on the
same day, in contrast to the ECB’s other types of open-market operations (ECB 2006b). The
ECB most often used FTOs to counteract imbalances in reserve accounts that built up during
each four-week reserve maintenance period, though the central bank did not exclude FTOs
from the possibility of fighting crises.3
Normally, FTOs provided or absorbed reserves so that short-term interest rates remained
near their target. The ECB set the size of each FTO according to the reserves position of the
Eurosystem, which it measured constantly. For instance, on July 10, 2007, “The ECB’s
liquidity forecasts show[ed] a liquidity imbalance of EUR 2.5 billion today, the last day of the
reserve maintenance period.” As a result, the ECB “launch[ed] a liquidity providing finetuning operation today at 10:00 a.m. with a view to counter this imbalance” (ECB 2020).
Normally, each imbalance triggered an equally sized response. During the GFC, however, the
way the ECB allotted FTOs demonstrated that it could not confidently estimate the reserve
imbalance. Instead of offering a fixed amount of liquidity, the ECB in two instances satisfied
all requests from banks for liquidity, letting demand drive the size of the FTO and prefiguring
the ECB’s crisis-era changes to term refinancing operations (TROs) (Trichet 2010). Even
when the ECB did set FTO sizes, it often followed up the first FTO with more operations on
successive days. These deviations from normal procedure distinguished crisis-era liquidityproviding FTOs from other FTOs.
All operations considered in this study also followed spikes in interbank funding spreads,
and three FTOs followed the default or bankruptcy of a large bank (see

Indeed, the ECB placed few restrictions on FTOs, noting that "their frequency is not standardised; their
maturity is not standardised; liquidity-providing fine-tuning reverse operations are normally executed through
quick tenders, although the possibility of using bilateral tenders is not excluded” (ECB 2006b).
3
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Figure 2) (ECB 2021).
2. Legal Authority: Article 18.1 of the Statute of the European System of Central
Banks (ESCB) authorized the ECB to conduct FTOs.
The 1992 Treaty on European Union included several annexes related to the functioning of
the Union. Member States that also adopted the euro as their official currency devolved many
powers of financial regulation to the EU through these annexes. In the realm of monetary
policy, the EU permitted the ECB and the national central banks to:
•

“operate in the financial markets by buying and selling outright (spot and forward)
or under repurchase agreement and by lending or borrowing claims and marketable
instruments, whether in Community or in non-Community currencies, as well as
precious metals;

•

“conduct credit operations with credit institutions and other market participants,
with lending being based on adequate collateral” (European Union 1992).

The Statute of the ESCB also vested in the ECB Governing Council the responsibility to
formulate monetary policy and guidelines for the Bank’s functioning (European Union
1992). In turn, the Governing Council allowed itself to “change the instruments, conditions,
criteria and procedures for the execution of Eurosystem monetary policy operations” (ECB
2006b). The power to change such instruments and conditions would become important as
the ECB expanded eligible collateral and participants for its FTOs.
3. Part of a Package: The ECB often reacted to market events with FTOs before
expanding its LTROs.
FTOs were the ECB’s first line of defense in the early stages of the Global Financial Crisis,
before the ECB institutionalized changes to its monetary policy (Borio and Nelson 2008).
When interbank funding spreads spiked, as in August 2007, the ECB filled demand with FTOs
before it expanded LTRO size, frequency, or terms.
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Figure 2 links each liquidity-providing FTO with its associated trigger and a subsequent
LTRO expansion. As the crisis wore on, the ECB did not unwind its LTRO policies, providing
it with more capacity to calm markets than when the crisis began. The expansions in LTRO
policy before October 2008 prefigured the ECB’s shift from relying on FTOs to LTROs as
crisis-fighting tools. FTOs were then relegated to tools for cushioning and monitoring
interbank funding demand when large LTROs matured (Runkel 2022). See Figure 10 in the
Appendix to compare maturing LTROs, FTOs, and Allotted LTROs.
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Figure 2: Market Events, FTOs, and LTROs
FTO
LTRO Change
Allotment
Bids
Date Change
EUR 95
EUR 95
8/9
billion*
billion
EUR 61
EUR 110
8/10
billion
billion
8/22
EUR 48
EUR 84
8/13
billion
billion
EUR 8
EUR 46
First
8/14
billion
billion
SLTRO
9/6 “Volatility in the euro
EUR 42
EUR 91
Second
9/11
9/6
money market”
billion
billion
SLTRO
Not an emergency
EUR 9
EUR 45
3/11
measure**
billion
billion
3/20 Bear Stearns
EUR 15
EUR 66
6-month
3/20
billion
billion
LTRO
3/28
No significant market
EUR 15
EUR 31
3/31
event identified
billion
billion
9/15 Lehman Brothers
EUR 30
EUR 90
Expanded
9/15
bankruptcy, sale of
billion
billion
collateral
Merrill Lynch, and
EUR 70
EUR 102
and
9/16
takeover of American
billion
billion
introduced
International Group
EUR 25
EUR 49
9/18
10/15 fixed-rate,
billion
billion
full9/24 Washington Mutual
EUR 40
EUR 50
allotment;
9/24
bank run
billion
billion
oneNA No significant market
EUR 25
EUR 25
month
10/9
event identified
billion*
billion
LTROs
* The ECB conducted these operations using fixed-rate, full-allotment procedures.
** The ECB conducted this operation on the last day of the maintenance period to offset low takeup of liquidity earlier in the maintenance period. It is therefore not an emergency measure.
Date

2008

2007

Market Trigger
Date Event
8/9 BNP Paribas freezes
two hedge funds with
large positions in
subprime mortgages

Source: ECB 2020; ECB 2021.

4. Management: The ECB managed the facility along with the national central banks.
The Statute of the ESCB gave to the ECB Executive Board—composed of its president, vicepresident, and four appointees—responsibility to implement the monetary policy decided
by the Governing Council. To the extent that the Governing Council deliberated and adopted
new policies and interest rates during the Global Financial Crisis, it also managed the EU’s
main and longer-term refinancing operations. The Governing Council consisted of the
Executive Board and the governor of each national central bank (European Union 1992). The
Governing Council met twice a month, with monetary policy decisions made every four
weeks until December 2014 and every six weeks subsequently. Additionally, each national
central bank retained certain rights relating to downstream tender procedures, including the
right to impose sanctions on, refuse the collateral of, and require more collateral from any
counterparty (ECB 2006b).
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5. Administration: FTOs were unscheduled, irregular, and could be deployed within
a day; the ECB used multi-rate auctions for all but two FTOs.
The ECB conducted all FTOs according to its “quick tender” procedures. Unlike its “standard
tender” procedures, quick tenders were announced, allotted, and settled on the same day.
Most FTOs followed a multi-rate, or “American,” auction:
•

First, the ECB announced the tender through wire services (see segment 1a and 1b
in Figure 3).

•

Counterparties then submitted bids through their respective national central bank
(segment 2). Requesting banks could submit up to 10 bids, each requesting a
particular amount of liquidity and offering to pay a particular interest rate (ECB
2006b).

•

Next, the Eurosystem compiled bids from the national central banks and accepted
bidders (segment 3), starting with the highest interest rates offered until the
aggregate amount of liquidity offered had been allotted (segment 4a).

•

Last, the ECB announced tender results (segment 4b) and settled FTOs with
counterparties through the Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement
Express Transfer (TARGET) System (segment 5) (ECB 2006b).

The Eurosystem and counterparties completed these auctions in about three hours, as
shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Normal Time Frame for Quick Tenders

Source: ECB 2006b.
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The ECB conducted two FTOs using a fixed-rate, full-allotment procedure: one on August 9,
2007, and the other on October 9, 2008. The August 9 FTO was the first open-market
operation using fixed-rate, full-allotment since two FTOs conducted after the September 11,
2001, attacks in the US (ECB 2021). That is, the ECB still received bids through the national
central banks, still formally announced tenders 10 minutes before receiving bids (informally
at irregular intervals), and still settled an hour after the bid deadline. Only the announcement
and the allotment changed. The ECB ceased to announce an amount to be allotted since
counterparty demand determined allotment sizes. During allotment, it satisfied all amounts
requested.
6. Eligible Participants: Until October 2008, national central banks selected
institutions for FTO participation from the list of institutions eligible for all openmarket operations, based on their activity in the money market. After that, any
participant in open-market operations was eligible.
National central banks selected a limited set of eligible participants based, primarily, on that
institution’s activity in the money market. Central banks may also have taken into account
“the efficiency of the trading desk and the bidding potential” (ECB 2006b). ECB guidelines
required national central banks to select these participants from the set of institutions
eligible for general open-market operations. To be eligible, institutions must have been:
•

Subject to minimum reserve requirements; this requirement effectively limited
participation to those banks located in the eurozone (ECB 2007b);

•

Financially sound;4 and

•

In good standing with the regulations of the ECB and its national central bank.

ECB regulations anticipated that national central banks would deal exclusively with all of the
counterparties they had selected for each FTO. If, for some reason, a national bank could not
engage all selected counterparties in an operation, it was expected to engage the various
counterparties on a rotational basis to ensure equitable access (ECB 2006b).
On October 3, 2008, the Governing Council expanded the set of eligible counterparties to
include any participant in open-market operations (ECB 2008b). National central banks
retained the right to require specific capabilities from counterparties. This change only
affected the last emergency liquidity–providing FTO, which occurred on October 9, 2008.
That operation attracted 99 bidders; earlier FTOs attracted from 25 to 62 bidders (ECB
2021).
7. Funding Source: The Eurosystem created reserves to fund FTOs.
FTO balances are difficult to track, since national central banks published financial
statements at most once a week, while most FTOs carried maturities equal to one day. The
National regulators enforced this criterion. Counterparties subject to both harmonized and non-harmonized
EU/European Economic Area supervision were eligible (ECB 2006b).
4
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National Bank of Belgium’s March 2008 balance sheet lists as an asset the March 3 FTO,
implying that national central banks held the loans (National Bank of Belgium 2008).
8. Program Size: The ECB fixed the size of most FTOs.
The ECB’s variable-rate FTOs allotted a predetermined amount, while its fixed-rate FTOs
allotted the total amount bid (ECB 2021). Liquidity-providing FTOs during the GFC were
unusually large compared with precrisis liquidity-providing FTOs, as Figure 4 highlights, but
were not as large as some liquidity-absorbing FTOs—used to counter large injections by
TROs (see Runkel 2022)—or the end-of-maintenance-period FTOs that implemented the
ECB’s frontloading policy (see Key Design Decision No. 14, Impact on Monetary Policy
Transmission).
Funds awarded in FTO operations ranged from EUR 9 billion to EUR 95 billion, but bids
ranged from EUR 25 billion to EUR 110 billion, with one operation being more than five times
oversubscribed (ECB 2021). Figure 1 visualizes the relative bid-cover ratios of different
auctions, while Figure 2 shows the allotment sizes and amounts bid. Since operations
matured overnight, EUR 95 billion was also the largest FTO amount outstanding. Figure 2
also demonstrates how the ECB tapered allotments in the days following the EUR 95 billion
FTO on August 9, 2007, despite an increase in bids to EUR 110 billion on August 10. The ECB
did not comment on why it decreased allotment sizes. Adding up overnight allocations over
12 separate sessions between August 9, 2007—when BNP Paribas froze three funds invested
in the mortgage-backed securities market—and October 15, 2008—when the ECB
announced expanded policies as responses to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the ECB
allotted a total of EUR 482 billion through the FTOs (ECB 2021).
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Figure 4: Liquidity-Providing and -Absorbing FTOs, with Crisis-Era FTOs Highlighted

Source: ECB 2021.

9. Individual Participation Limits: The ECB did not impose individual participation
limits.
The ECB’s guidelines added individual-debtor participation limits as a possible regulation
after the adoption of fixed-rate, full-allotment facilities (ECB 2009). However, no documents
suggest that the ECB enforced this guideline during the GFC.
10. Rate Charged: Rates varied for most FTOs.
All but the first and last operations used variable-rate, fixed-allotment auctions. Successful
banks paid the interest rates they bid. The first and last operations used a procedure known
as fixed-rate, full-allotment, which saw the ECB provide as much liquidity as banks requested
at the central bank’s policy rate. Later, the fixed-rate, full-allotment approach would signal
the ECB’s commitment to providing as much liquidity as banks needed (see Runkel 2022).
For the variable-rate auctions, FTO marginal interest rates—the rates of the lowest accepted
bids—hovered between 4% and 4.3%, with spreads between maximum and minimum bids
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ranging from 10 to 15 basis points in 2007.5 The spread widened to 75 basis points closer to
October 2008. As in

5 The ECB

set minimum rates for variable-rate tenders; until the FTO that settled March 31, 2008, the minimum
rate was 4%. From the four variable-rate FTOs starting September 15, the minimum rate was 4.25% (ECB
2021).
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Figure 2, FTOs charged rates slightly above EONIA (ECB 2021; Bank of France 1999–2021).
Since EONIA measures unsecured overnight liquidity, secured funding priced at or above it
could be considered a penalty rate. However, the FTO rate could only be considered a small
penalty, explaining why some FTOs were more than four times oversubscribed (ECB 2021).
Borio and Nelson (2008) noted that emergency facilities followed classic rules of supply and
demand:
As the corresponding rates are set above (lending) and below (deposit) the policy rate,
the extent to which such facilities are activated depends in part on the size of the penalty
compared with this rate.
11. Eligible Collateral: The ECB expanded its eligible collateral as it adopted the fixedrate, full-allotment framework.
The ECB (2006b) adopted a unified framework for Eurosystem open-market operations in
2007. Under this framework, the ECB accepted marketable debt instruments, such as
government bonds, and nonmarketable assets, namely bank loans and retail mortgagebacked debt (RMBD; ECB 2006b). All assets—or their issuers—must have been rated at least
A-. Only collateral denominated in euros was eligible. Additional criteria are summarized in
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Figure 5.
Banks borrowing from a central bank in one EU country could deposit collateral held or
issued in a different EU country (ECB 2006b).
When, in October 2008, the ECB adopted a fixed-rate, full-allotment regime for open-market
operations, it also expanded its list of eligible collateral. Specifically, it added:
•

marketable debt issued in the eurozone but denominated in dollars, pounds, and
yen, subject to an additional 8% haircut;

•

debt instruments issued by credit institutions traded on specific nonregulated
markets, subject to an additional 5% haircut;

•

subordinated debt instruments guaranteed by financially sound guarantors, subject
to an additional 10-15% haircut;

•

fixed-term deposits held with the Eurosystem; and

•

marketable securities rated as low as BBB- except for asset-backed securities,
subject to an additional 5% haircut for assets rated lower than A- (Regulation No
1053 2008).
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Figure 5 reprints key eligibility criteria from before and after October 15.
The ECB’s policy before and during the GFC mitigated risk by valuing collateral daily and
applying haircuts. It did not change its general haircut policies during the Global Financial
Crisis but did tweak their parameters. It used a schedule of haircuts across the Eurosystem
that varied haircuts by credit rating, maturity, asset class, and type of coupons (ECB 2006b).
Shortly after the ECB expanded eligible FTO collateral in October 2008, it ratcheted up
haircuts on credit claims and asset-backed securities (ECB 2009). See Figures 8 and 9 in the
Appendix for full pre- and post-October 2008 haircut schedules.
If on any day the value of collateral fell below what was required, national central banks
applied margin calls to raise collateral. A counterparty could submit collateral issued or held
in another eurozone country. To enforce these requirements, the ECB had at its disposal an
array of possible sanctions, including expulsion from current and future open-market
operations (ECB 2006b).
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Figure 5: Key Eligibility Criteria on Collateral Posted for ECB Monetary Policy
Operations
Eligibility Criterion

ECB Guideline Enforced Changes from October 15,
from January 1, 2007
2008

Type of asset

Marketable
instruments

debt + securities in certain
nonregulated markets

Nonmarketable
debt
instruments such as bank
loans and retail mortgagebacked debt (RMBD)
•

+ subordinated marketable
debt instruments (provided
a guarantee payable on first
demand)

Bank loans could be + syndicated loans governed
governed by up to by three sets of laws
two sets of laws
(syndicated loans governed
by English or Welsh law
were briefly added)

Credit standard

High
credit
standard + At least BBB–
according to ECAF (in the
case
of
marketable
securities, those rated A- or
higher)

Issuer of marketable assets

Central banks; public sector; No change
private sector; international
institutions

Debtor
assets

Currency

of

nonmarketable Public sector; nonfinancial No change
corporations; international
institutions;
credit
institutions
EUR

+ JPY, GBP, USD
marketable debt

for

Source: ECB 2006b; Regulation No 1053 2008.

12. Loan Duration: The fine-tuning operations carried overnight maturities, except
the final one.
The ECB designed fine-tuning operations with no fixed maturity (ECB 2006b). In practice,
the 12 FTOs that provided emergency liquidity during the GFC carried overnight
maturities—holidays did not count—with one exception (“Schedule of Public Holidays for
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2008” 2006). The October 9, 2008, operation carried a six-day maturity (ECB 2021). These
short maturities demanded that the ECB, national central banks, and counterparties ready
themselves for successive FTOs during periods of high banking distress, but they also
allowed the ECB to better monitor and respond to changes in interbank funding markets.
13. Other Conditions: The ECB imposed no other conditions besides its risk-avoidance
measures.
No documents indicate that ECB liquidity support carried conditions besides its risk-control
measures described in Key Design Decision Nos. Error! Reference source not found. and
Error! Reference source not found..
14. Impact on Monetary Policy Transmission: The ECB lessened liquidity at the end of
the reserve maintenance period to offset injections from FTOs.
During the GFC FTOs, the ECB practiced “frontloading,” which “provided larger amounts of
credit at the beginning of each reserve maintenance period6 and smaller amounts of credit
at the end” (Trichet 2010). During the periods of high FTO usage, the bank would allot
smaller main refinancing operations and longer-term refinancing operations. Over the
course of the GFC, this frontloading evolved from using the ECB’s refinancing operations to
a single, large, liquidity-absorbing fine-tuning operation on the last day of the reserve
maintenance period (Svendsen and Wojt 2014).

The ECB enforced reserve requirements by supervising the average level of reserves during reserve
maintenance periods, which lasted four to five weeks (ECB 2007a).
6
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Figure 6 shows this evolution. Frontloading “provided banks with a greater degree of
comfort in meeting their needs” because the ECB enforced reserve requirements as an
average over the maintenance period (Borio and Nelson 2008). A bank could borrow cheap
ECB liquidity to boost its liquidity position early in the maintenance period so that late in the
maintenance period it wouldn’t have to worry about violating the reserve requirements.
Throughout 2007, Borio and Nelson (2008) point out, excess reserves as a portion of total
reserves decreased slightly, from 0.5% to 0.4%, despite the injection of some EUR 258 billion
in FTOs and the introduction of SLTROs. The ECB conducted liquidity-absorbing FTOs at the
end of each maintenance period in which an emergency FTO had previously been conducted
(ECB 2021; ECB 2006a; ECB 2007a).
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Figure 6: The Evolution of Frontloading from 2007 (left) to 2010 (right)

Source: Svendsen and Wojt 2014.

15. Other Options: The ECB conducted FTOs before implementing any other crisisfighting measures.
The president of the ECB dated the start of the Global Financial Crisis to August 9, 2007, the
date of the first FTO (Trichet 2010). FTOs were, until October 2008, the ECB’s first line of
defense to support financial stability in response to market shocks. No documents indicate
any prior strategies.
16. Similar Programs in Other Countries: Other countries used similar operations
during the crisis, though they were not coordinated.
Borio and Nelson (2008) show similar operations during 2007 and 2008 in Australia,
Canada, Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Their table is
reprinted in Figure 7. They note that the Swiss National Bank even engaged in similar
frontloading. Perhaps most significantly for financial stability, the Federal Reserve auctioned
“nearly double the average outstanding amount of credit provided via repurchase
agreements” on August 10, 2007. Sweden also carried out fine-tuning operations during the
crisis (Sellin 2018). None of these operations featured coordination among central banks,
unlike some longer-term operations and interest rate changes (see Runkel 2022).
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Figure 7: Comparison of Crisis Policy Changes

Note: The headers denote countries surveyed and are, from left to right, Australia, Canada, the Eurozone/euro
area, Japan, Switzerland, the UK, and the US.
Source: Borio and Nelson 2008.

17. Communication: The ECB communicated FTO policy through two ad hoc
communications and two press releases.
Per their name, ad hoc communications take several forms and purposes. Most ad hoc
communications announce monetary policy operations, but some also describe policy
changes, such as the communication on August 9, 2007. In this release, the ECB announced
that it would satisfy all demand at the main refinancing rate (ECB 2020). This prefigured the
ECB’s move to supplying unlimited liquidity a year later (Trichet 2010).
The two press releases that communicated FTO policy were issued in October 2008, after all
but one emergency liquidity–providing FTO had been conducted. First, on October 3, the ECB
widened the set of eligible FTO participants to all institutions eligible for standard-tender
monetary policy operations (ECB 2008b). Second, on October 8, the ECB changed the default
tender procedure for the main refinancing operation to fixed-rate, full-allotment (ECB
2008c). The release did not specify that the change would apply to FTOs, but, in an ad hoc
communication before the tender, the ECB announced that the “operation implement[ed]
already today the decision of yesterday […] to satisfy all demand of counterparties, i.e., full
allotment, for refinancing at the main refinancing rate” (ECB 2021).
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18. Disclosure: The ECB reported aggregated FTO results the day after they settled.
ECB reporting guidelines did not change throughout the crisis. Since the nature of tenders
changed from variable-rate to fixed-rate, full-allotment, reports changed accordingly. On the
day of allotment, the day before tenders were settled, the ECB reported the total amount bid
by counterparties (potential counterparties in the case of tenders without full allotment), the
total amount allotted, and, in the case of variable-rate tenders, the marginal and maximum
bid rates (ECB 2006b). The ECB did not report which counterparties bid for a tender, nor did
the Governing Council report minutes of its meetings. Since the GFC, neither body has
released such information.
19. Stigma Strategy: Liquidity was provided through standing facilities, and ECB
guidelines already limited stigma.
Open-market operations used aggregate disclosures and high standards for participation to
limit stigma. Aggregate disclosures limited the ability of market observers to identify which
institutions borrowed from the facility. To participate in open-market operations, financial
institutions must have been financially sound, which may have also contributed to the high
participation (ECB 2006b). ECB press releases do not mention borrowing stigma, and it does
not appear in the scholarly literature.
20. Exit Strategy: The Eurosystem shifted to providing support through its main and
longer-term refinancing operations.
After the October 9, 2008, operation, the ECB did not conduct another liquidity-providing
FTO until July 1, 2010 (ECB 2021). The October 15 expansions of LTROs, detailed in Runkel
(2022), marked a shift in policy that afforded LTROs greater capacity to quell tumultuous
markets. This shift away from overnight liquidity could be seen as consistent with the
analysis of Bartolini and Prati (2003), which concluded that the ECB favored minimal finetuning over the Federal Reserves’ daily operations. However, the ECB increased its liquidityabsorbing FTOs after October 2008 and, by May 2009, was siphoning liquidity from the
European financial system every week (ECB 2021).
When liquidity-providing FTOs returned in 2010, they did so as accessories to the LTROs
rather than as tools providing emergency liquidity. Large FTOs, detailed in Figure 10 in the
Appendix, smoothed the maturities and allotments of one- and three-year LTRO maturities,
when more than EUR 400 billion could be due back from bank balance sheets, and more than
EUR 500 billion more could be allotted (ECB 2021).
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Appendix
Figure 8: Pre–October 2008 ECB Haircut Schedule

Source: ECB 2006b.
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Figure 9: Post–October 2008 ECB Haircut Schedule

Source: ECB 2009.
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2012

2011

2010

Figure 10: Non-Emergency GFC FTOs
Maturing LTROs
Date Maturity
Allotment
(billions)
12 months EUR 442
7/1
3 months EUR 2
12 months EUR 75
6 months EUR 18
9/30
3 months EUR 132
11/11 6 months EUR 36
12/23 3 months EUR 19
3 months EUR 141
12/20
6 months
2/28

3 months

FTO
Date Maturity Allotment
(billions)

Date

Allotted LTROs
Maturity Allotment
(billions)

7/1

6 days

EUR 111

6/30

3 months EUR 132

9/30

6 days

EUR 29

9/29

3 months EUR 104

11/11
12/23

6 days
13 days

EUR 13
EUR 21

11/9
12/22

1 month EUR 64
3 months EUR 149

12/20

1 day

EUR 142

12/21

2/28

1 day

EUR 134

2/29

EUR 50
EUR 39

3 months EUR 30
3 years

EUR 489

3 months EUR 6
3 years

EUR 530

Source: ECB 2021.
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